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ELLEN HOCHSTEDLER STEURY, Ph.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is often little distinction between the treatment of those
with mental disorder and the treatment of those held criminally re-
sponsible.1 Furthermore, as other forms of social control wane, the
criminal justice system is expected to fill the void, a situation that
will unduly tax not only the operation of the criminal justice system,
but also the meaning and the symbolic value of criminal responsibil-
ity.2 Recently, these two familiar observations have re-surfaced and
merged with a specific focus: the mentally disordered in the criminal
justice system. Theorists claim that reforms in law and policy gov-
erning civil commitment have introduced a new class of mentally
* Associate Professor, Criminal Justice Program, University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, P.O. Box 786, Milwaukee, WI 53201.
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1 M. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF
REASON (1965); M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(1977); Penrose, Mental Disease and Crime: Outline of a Comparative Study of European Statis-
tics, 28 MED. PSYCHIATRY Q. 1 (1939).
2 F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMINOL-
OGY (1964).
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disordered into the already strained criminal justice system.3 Legis-
lators and policymakers have lent credence to this claim, now com-
monly known as the criminalization hypothesis.4 This claim has also
been supported by some scholarly research.5
The criminalization hypothesis is fairly clear on two accounts,
both subject only to longitudinal testing. First, the hypothesis
clearly implies that a certain subpopulation of those previously
served by the mental health system has been shifted, in large part, to
the criminal justice system. This aspect of the hypothesis specifies
the process; it provides an explanation of the mechanism of change.
Second, the criminalization hypothesis claims that, in contrast to a
previous era, more mentally disordered persons are entangled in
the criminal justice system today. This aspect of the hypothesis rep-
resents the logical conclusion of the specified process, the shift.
This second aspect provides a quantitative specification of the cur-
rent situation in comparison to the previous situation. The consen-
sus on what the criminalization hypothesis represents ends there,
however.
The criminalization literature reveals no consensus on what
criminalization itself entails or means. In fact, very little attention
has been given to the definition of criminalization. The criminaliza-
tion hypothesis is silent with respect to how cases involving mentally
disordered defendants are processed and disposed of in the criminal
justice system. Knowing the nature of the control exercised over
the mentally disordered in the criminal justice system is critical to a
useful definition of criminalization. As long as the key term
"criminalization" remains undefined, the criminalization hypothesis
will remain inadequately specified. The research reported here rep-
S Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior:, Possible Side-effect of a
New Mental Health Law, 23 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 13 (1972); Stelovich, From
Hospital to the Prison: A Step Forward in Deinstitutionalization? 30 Hosp. & COMMUNITY Psy-
CHATRY 618 (1979); see Teplin, The Criminalization of the Mentally Ill: Speculation in Search of
Data, 94 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 54 (1983).
4 Durham, The Impact of Deinstitutionalization on the Current Treatment of the Mentally Ill,
12 INVLJ. OF L. & PSYCHIATRY 117 (1989).
5 See, e.g., Arvanites, The Impact of State Mental Hospital Deinstitutionalization on Commit-
ments for Incompetency to Stand Trial, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 307 (1988); Dickey, Incompetency and
the Nondangerous Mentally Ill Client, 16 C~iM. L. BULL. 22 (1980); Geller & Lister, The
Process of Criminal Commitment for Pretrial Psychiatric Examination: An Evaluation, 135 AM. J.
OF PSYCHIATRY 53 (1978); Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative Arrest Rate
of the Mentally Ill, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 794 (1984); but see Steadman, Monahan, Duffee,
Hartstone, & Robbins, The Impact of State Mental Hospital Deinstitutionalization on United
States Prison Populations, 1969-1978, 75 J. OF C~iM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 474 (1984); see
also note 41, infra.
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resents a first step toward specifying criminalization in practical
terms based on empirical evidence.
II. SPECIFYING "CRIMINALIZATION"
Three competing alternative specifications of the term criminal-
ization suggest themselves, any one of which could be consistent
with the criminalization hypothesis. One possible specification is
that the mentally disordered are treated more punitively than other criminals,
or are "twice-cursed." Some previous criminalization research di-
rectly addresses this possibility. 6 In most previous studies, however,
this orientation operates implicitly, reflected in the research design
through the choice of criterion variables or sampling frame. For ex-
ample, studies that compare the disordered and non-disordered
with respect to arrest rates or the severity of punishment imposed
are premised on this specification although not explicitly. 7
A second possible specification of the criminalization hypothe-
sis is that the mentally disordered are treated as mentally disor-
dered, and therefore differently (perhaps more leniently, perhaps
not). A corollary of this differential treatment expectation is that the
mentally disordered are treated as patients within the criminal justice system..
In other words, the criminal justice system has become a major pro-
vider of mandated psychiatric treatment. This possibility is more
often simply asserted in the research literature than empirically
tested. 8
Consideration of these two competing expectations leads to an
obvious third possibility, largely ignored by researchers. Criminal-
ization may mean that the mentally disordered are not distinguished from
others in the criminal justice system, but instead are treated merely as
criminals. Rather than providing grounds on which to reject the
criminalization hypothesis, such findings are arguably in accord with
the hypothesis. The analysis presented here is not intended as a test
of the criminalization hypothesis itself. Rather, it is an effort to em-
pirically specify the key term "criminalization."
6 See, e.g., Hochstedler, Criminal Prosecution of the Mentally Disordered, 20 LAw & Soci-
ETY REV. 279 (1986) [hereinafter Criminal Prosecution]; Hochstedler, Twice-Cursed? The
Mentally Disordered Defendant, 14 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 251 (1987) [hereinafter Twice
Cursed].
7 See, e.g., Cocozza, Melick, & Steadman, Trends in Violent Crime Among Ex-mental Pa-
tients, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 317 (1978); Steadman, Vanderwyst, & Ribner, Comparing Arrest
Rates of Mental Patients and Criminal Offenders, 135 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1218 (1978);
Steadman, Monahan, Duffee, Hartstone, & Robbins, supra note 5.




The data used in this report pertain to randomly selected cases
stemming from criminal misdemeanor 9 charges filed between Janu-
ary 1, 1981 and December 30, 1985 in the Milwaukee (Wisconsin)
Circuit Court, a court of general jurisdiction. The court serves a
single urban county of approximately one million residents. I drew
a random sample of 4958 criminal misdemeanor cases from official,
public court records, from which 5924 defendants' names were col-
lected. 10 I then pared this collection of defendants' names to elimi-
nate duplicates,11 a procedure that produced a random sample of
unique defendants from the original random sample of cases. I further
identified the defendants as either possessing or not possessing a
record of admission at the local public psychiatric facility, the Mil-
waukee County Mental Health Complex (CMHC), and the sample
was stratified on that basis. All defendants with a record of admis-
sion were retained for the working sample (N= 1068), except for
cases where court records could not be located (2%). Defendants
without a record of admission were systematically subsampled by a
factor of four which produced a sample of 1116 non-psychiatric de-
fendants and associated criminal cases after missing cases were de-
leted from the sample. The product of these sampling procedures is
a stratified random sample of defendants (N = 2184).
The sample described here consists only of cases in which
charges were issued by the prosecutor and survived the initial judi-
cial review of the arrest decision as mandated by Gerstein v. Pugh.12 A
sampling frame based on cases filed is not as inclusive as a sampling
frame of arrests, yet it is more desirable in some respects, given the
operating standards in the study jurisdiction. Many arrests never
result in prosecution, i.e., never result in any but the least significant
form of criminalization. As front-line agents of order maintenance,
police sometimes arrest citizens without expecting or even in-
9 The sampling frame excluded criminal traffic offenses and simple marijuana pos-
session of small amounts, on the premise that these offenses, while very frequent, are
not typically viewed as mala in se offenses.
10 Some cases had multiple defendants, in which event all defendants became part of
the sample.
S1I Some defendants were involved in more than one case in the five-year time period.
Only-one case was retained for each unique defendant, and as a rule, this was the most
recent case. An exception to this rule was made when the most recent case in the sample
was either a bail-jumping or escape charge and the underlying charge had also been
drawn in the original sample. In that event, the case associated with the underlying
charge was retained for the sample in preference to the bail-jumping or escape charge.
12 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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tending for prosecution to follow.13 More frequently, and more im-
portantly, police arrest persons who are never subsequently
prosecuted because the cases do not survive the prosecutor's
screen. The prosecutor wields a great deal of discretion, which is
supposed to be applied in accord with "doing justice."
Prosecutorial discretion is widely exercised in the study jurisdiction,
and about 30 percent of the cases are culled prior to presentment in
court for review.1 4 This sample, then, represents all those whose
arrests were not immediately screened out by the prosecutor or dis-
missed by the reviewing magistrate for legal insufficiency or human-
itarian reasons pertinent to justice.
Misdemeanor cases are the focus of this particular examination
because it is likely that differential processing of cases will be most
obvious among misdemeanor offenses. A variety of findings sup-
port this presumption. First, HochstedlerI 5 presented evidence to
suggest the mentally disordered are not granted leniency if the of-
fense exceeds an unspoken operating threshold of seriousness.
Moreover, findings presented by Bonovitz and Guy' 6 showed an in-
crease in the proportion of inmates in a prison psychiatric hospital
unit arrested for minor offenses (e.g., disorderly conduct and tres-
passing) after commitment laws had been changed. In addition,
Dickey's 17 research findings showed an increase in evaluations for
incompetency to stand trial particularly among those charged with
minor offenses. Finally, Arvanites'18 findings showed a trend similar
to the one Dickey reported in some, but not all, jurisdictions in his
study. These research findings, coupled with a general understand-
13 Studies of police have established that sometimes arrests are made for reasons
other than to initiate the prosecution process. An arrest may provide a cooling-off pe-
riod, or over-night shelter, or protection from predators; see e.g., Bittner, Police Discretion
in Emergency Apprehension of Mentally Ill Persons, 14 Soc. PROBS. 278 (1967); Matthews,
Observations on Police Policy and Procedures for Emergency Detention of the Mentally Ill, 61 J.
GRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE Sci. 283 (1970).
14 Information from Deputy District Attorney Herman B.John, established that 30%
of the cases filed were screened out. According to Deputy District Attorney Thomas P.
Schneider, cases are screened out in this jurisdiction if they do not meet all of the three
following criteria upon initial review by the assistant district attorney (ADA): (1) the
case can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the issuing ADA believes (a subjective,
personal assessment) that the defendant is guilty, and (3) the issuing ADA believes that
issuing the charge is "the 'right' [i.e., 'just'] thing to do."
15 Hochstedler, Criminal Prosecution of the Mentally Disordered, 20 LAw & Soc. REV. 279,
289-90 (1986).
16 Bonovitz & Guy, Impact of Restrictive Civil Commitment Procedures on a Prison Psychiatric
Service, 136 AM.J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1045 (1979).
17 Dickey, supra note 5.
18 Arvanites, supra note 5.
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ing of how law-enforcement discretion operates, 19 support the pre--
sumption that if the mentally disordered are differentially
processed, or if the imposition of mental health treatment is the ul-
terior motive for invoking the criminal justice apparatus, it would be
most obvious among misdemeanor caseswhere discretion to grant
or withhold leniency is the greatest.20
B. MEASURES
1. Criminalization Measures: Punitiveness
The criminalization research to date is of limited value because
of three basic problems involving measurement of the dependent
variable, criminalization. First, there is no apparent agreement as to
a single useful indicator of criminalization. Whether managed as a
variable or as a defining element of the sampling frame, indicators
vary widely across studies. Some researchers have used arrest as an
indicator,2' others have used prosecution, 22 and still others have
used penal incarceration 23 or jail detention. 24 Each of these meas-
ures denotes a different degree of criminalization. Second, no sin-
gle indicator alone is an adequate measure of the broad concept of
criminalization. The use of a single indicator to measure criminal-
ization, a phenomenon that results from a series of decisions in a
dynamic and interdependent system, falls far short of the mark.
Third, research results based on single item indicators from differ-
ent jurisdictions cannot be patched together to form a whole or
composite picture. Differences across jurisdictions are too great to
allow generalizations about criminalization, especially when
criminalization is examined only in fragments.
Virtually any multi-jurisdictional research on criminal justice
can be used to demonstrate the important differences in the opera-
19 See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1971).
20 Standard 7-2.5(a) and (b) of THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS (1986), published a year after the end of this study period, instructs law-
enforcement officers to forego criminal prosecution of mentally disordered misdemean-
ants, and transport such persons directly to a mental health facility. On the other hand,
criminal prosecution of mentally disordered alleged felons is encouraged.
21 See Cocozza, Melick, & Steadman, supra note 7; Schuerman & Kobrin, Exposure of
Community Mental Health Clients to the Criminal Justice System: Client/Criminal or Pa-
tient/Prisoner, in MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 87 (L. Teplin ed. 1984);
Steadman, Cocozza, & Melick, Explaining the Increased Arrest Rate Among Mental Patients:
The Changing Clientele of State Hospitals, 135 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 816 (1978); Teplin, supra
note 5.
22 See Arvanites, supra note 5; Dickey, supra note 5; Hochstedler, Criminal Prosecution,
supra note 6; Hochstedler, Twice-Cursed, supra note 6.
23 See Steadman, Vanderwyst, & Ribner, supra note 7.
24 See Teplin, supra note 3.
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tion of criminal justice in different settings. James Q. Wilson's semi-
nal work on the different styles of policing,25 which have very real
and very different consequences for the citizen, provides one such
example. In some jurisdictions, prosecutors carefully screen arrests
and cull a substantial minority of them from the system without ever
issuing charges, while in others prosecutors issue charges in virtu-
ally every arrest.26 Lengthy pretrial detention is a commonplace oc-
currence in some jurisdictions, but not in others. 27 Moreover, in
some jurisdictions sanctions encountered before and during adjudi-
cation (i.e., jail detention) are more severe than the punishment, 28
while in others the punishment imposed after conviction is more se-
vere. 29 These studies and others underscore the point that seem-
ingly similar indicators may not, in fact, be tapping similar
phenomena across jurisdictions. This problem may be partially
cured by using multiple indicators of criminalization from a single
jurisdiction, an attempt to operationalize the concept of criminaliza-
tion in a more comprehensive manner.
Thus, the real differences between apparently equivalent in-
dicators of criminalization, coupled with research based on single-
item indicators, leaves unsettled the empirical specification of
criminalization. It is not enough, for example, to know that men-
tally disordered suspects are differentially selected for arrest;30 the
consequences of arrest are critical to a meaningful test of the
criminalization hypothesis. For example, it is possible that after the
arrest of the mentally disordered, they are not further criminalized
but instead are released or diverted to the mental health system. Is
this what is meant by criminalization? It is also possible that after
arrest, the problems of mentally disordered defendants are ignored
by the criminal justice system. These defendants may be left to sub-
sequently languish and deteriorate in jail and prison environments.
Is this what is meant by criminalization? Similarly, it is not sufficient
to know of an increase in the proportion of defendants either ex-
amined for, or committed because of, incompetency to stand trial.
31
25 J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER
IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES (1968).
26 W. McDonald, The Prosecutor's Domain, in THE PROSECUTOR 15 (W. McDonald ed.
1979). See also note 14, supra.
27 j. EISENSTEIN & N. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
CRIMINAL COURTS (1977).
28 M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMI-
NAL COURT (1979).
29 Ryan, Adjudication and Sentencing in a Misdemeanor Court: The Outcome is the Punishment,
15 LAW & Soc. REV. 79 (1980-81).
30 See Teplin, supra note 5.
31 See Arvanites, supra note 5; Dickey, supra note 5.
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Evaluation or even commitment for treatment does not indicate
whether the criminal law is subsequently used to punish these de-
fendants, or whether they escape the heavy hand of the law which
might otherwise be imposed. Would either result be viewed as
criminalization? Clearly, a more complete definition of criminaliza-
tion is necessary for an adequate examination of the criminalization
hypothesis. Until a more meaningful definition of criminalization is
established, support for or refutation of the criminalization hypoth-
esis has commensurately limited value. In short, the research con-
clusions are only as good as the indicators used.
This study employs several criminalization measures. The find-
ings reported here are based on the following five indicators, each
of which denotes a different degree of punitive sanction:
(1) whether there was any jail detention;
(2) length ofjail detention, if any;




This set of indicators allows an examination of the degree and
nature of various aspects of criminalization. Together, these indica-
tors are capable of describing a more comprehensive, informative
picture of criminalization in a single jurisdiction, because more than
one indicator is used, and because they all pertain to a single
jurisdiction.
2. Criminalization Measures: Patient Status
Defendants with a psychiatric history may or may not be recog-
nized, either officially or unofficially, as mentally disordered by the
criminal justice system. The existence of a mental health screening
unit in the Milwaukee District Attorney's office suggests that it is
likely that those with a history of psychiatric hospitalization are rec-
ognized by court workers. 33 Recent research findings from another
32 Length of term of imprisonment was a variable also collected, but the N's were too
small to be statistically reliable due to missing data and the relatively infrequent use of
imprisonment as punishment for misdemeanor offenses.
33 These data do not indicate with certainty whether or not the court knew of the
defendant's psychiatric history. It is reasonable to assume that in many, if not most,
cases, the court did know of the mental health history. InJanuary 1981 a Mental Health
Screening Unit was established in the District Attorney's Office. This unit was staffed by
a case worker who reviewed the charging lists to identify defendants known to be chroni-
cally mentally ill. Any defense attorney or prosecutor could refer a defendant to the
Screening Unit for a screening interview. If the case worker thought further evaluation
was warranted, a psychologist or psychiatrist would conduct a more thorough evalua-
tion. Often, the defendant would be a person known to the case worker, and the court
HOCHSTEDLER STEURY
jurisdiction lends plausibility to this presumption. 4
The data set used here includes the following indicators of offi-
cial recognition of a defendant's mental health problem:
(1) treatment mandated under criminal law authority as a condition
of freedom, either pretrial release or probation;
(2) evaluation for incompetency to stand trial;
(3) commitment for incompetency to stand trial;
(4) a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect; and
(5) a judgment of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.
These measures indicate the extent to which the criminal justice
system imposes mental health evaluation and treatment on its sub-
jects. Such court orders are interpreted here as "official recogni-
tion" of the mental disorder.
3. Independent Measures of Mental Disorder
The measures of mental disorder in criminalization research
suffer from the same problems as the measures of criminalization.
First, there is no agreement as to a single appropriate indicator of
mental disorder. Teplin3 5 notes this problem in her review of stud-
ies of mental disorder in jail populations. The phenomenon re-
ferred to by the term "mental disorder" is itself a fluid and variable
condition. Second, most studies rely on a single measure, often a
fairly narrow one (e.g., previous hospitalization in a state psychiatric
institution), a choice also criticized elsewhere.3 6 Third, previous re-
search has relied on single-item indicators to measure a phenome-
non that is the result of decisions made in a dynamic and
interdependent system.
Selecting an appropriate, robust operational definition of
mental disorder may be an even more difficult task than defining
criminalization. It is difficult and controversial to define and mea-
sure mental disorder even in the best of circumstances. To compli-
would be supplied with a brief psychiatric history of the defendant including such things
as hospitalizations, care by residential treatment centers, etc. Nonetheless, it is not clear
from these data what or how much the court knew about whom. The only positive indi-
cation of this is a court order for some kind of evaluation or treatment. There is no
negative indication.
34 See Teplin, Detecting Disorder: The Treatment of Mental Illness AmongJail Detainees, 58J.
OF CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 233, 235 (1990). Teplin reports that 32.5% of all
severely ill jail detainees were recognized as such by jail personnel, and 91.7% of those
known to the jail personnel as having a treatment history were detected. Teplin's mea-
sure of mental disorder was defined as both current and severe, a definition which differs
markedly from the one used in this study. Id. at 234.
35 See Teplin, supra note 3, at 63-64.
36 Id. at 64.
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cate matters, there is no reason to believe that mental health system
standards and operations are any more consistent across jurisdic-
tions than criminal justice standards. The mental health system is at
least as buffeted by fiscal constraints and other practical exigencies
as the criminal justice system. Moreover, it is less standardized by
procedural law. There is probably good reason to presume, given
the nature of the phenomenon under scrutiny, that there is less con-
sistency across jurisdictions in the mental health system than in the
criminal justice system. Generalizations and direct comparisons be-
tween jurisdictions are risky matters under such circumstances.
Again, one must conclude that a more comprehensive picture within
a jurisdiction is essential for a good understanding of the situation.
The measures of mental disorder used in this study were taken
from a single source: the admission files of the county mental health
complex. It is a shortcoming of this study, and a common one in the
criminalization research, that information on defendants' psychiatric
history is limited to the admission records of a single local public
hospital. It is, of course, possible that some of the defendants in the
sample had been treated or evaluated at other public mental health
facilities, or even at private hospitals. However, the county mental
health complex was clearly the primary service provider in the re-
gion. In 1983, the midpoint of the study period, admissions to the
county mental health complex accounted for 68%y of all psychiatric
admissions in the county.37 Moreover, this is the only facility in the
county that accepts short-term commitments allowed under the
state's emergency detention statute.3 8 Furthermore, given the eco-
nomic status of most of the defendants (80% were ruled indigent
for the purposes of defense at public expense), there can be little
doubt that the data used in this study was drawn from the institution
that provided most of the mental health services to the population
of defendants. In any case, it should be understood that these meth-
ods for identifying defendants with a psychiatric history would result
in a conservative estimate of their number, a factor which would
tend to obscure rather than exaggerate any real differences between
the two groups.
In the study reported here, I used a variety of measures to indi-
cate mental disorder, some of which are highly inclusive and others
quite restrictive and specialized. Listed in order of increasing re-
strictiveness, the measures used were:
37 Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services and Wisconsin Hospital As-
sociation, Wisconsin Hospital Directory (1983).
38 See Wis. STAT. ANN. 51.15 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
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(1) any evaluation for admission or treatment;
(2) any admission as an inpatient;
(3) more than two admissions as an inpatient;
(4) any involuntary admission as an inpatient;
(5) more than two involuntary admissions as an inpatient.
An evaluation for admission or treatment would generally be re-
garded as an unacceptably broad standard for establishing a psychi-
atric history. It is included here, along with more restrictive
measures, simply to yield a more complete picture of the situation. I
believe a very broad, inclusive measure is desirable to establish one
end of a variable that can be viewed in gradients. 39 The measures I
used here are inclusive in a second manner, as well. The measures
pertain to admission at any point in the defendant's lifetime, from
birth to the point of data collection (1986).
I employed successively restrictive measures of mental disor-
der, the most restrictive of which (more than two involuntary inpa-
tient admissions) denotes not only a chronic mental health problem,
but resistance to accepting treatment, as well. While none of these
measures, alone, is an adequate indicator of the very vague concept,
"mental disorder," the fact that the measures form a logical and em-
pirical scale40 is reassuring and helpful in giving definition to them
as individual measures. All of the mental disorder measures I used
indicate contact with the mental health system independent of psy-
chiatric evaluation or treatment ordered by the court in conjunction
with incompetency or insanity determinations.
41
39 The relatively new and controversial psychiatric classification of "borderline per-
sonality disorder," is one that provides an apt description of many persons involved in
the criminal justice system, see AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980). As a personality lisorder, it
is a classification often viewed as unworthy of an inpatient bed in the real world of lim-
ited resources. For reasons such as this one, a broadly inclusive measure is desirable.
40 Sixty-nine percent (N = 756) of those evaluated for admission were admitted as
inpatients. Of those admitted as inpatients, 70%o (N = 529) were admitted involunta-
rily. Furthermore, repeated admissions were associated with involuntary status. Of the
289 defendants with three or more inpatient admissions, 88% of them had been invol-
untarily admitted at least once (gamma = .85; taUb = .44).
41 Independent measures of mental disorder are critical to some examinations of the
criminalization hypothesis, a fact apparently overlooked by many researchers. Virtually
all the longitudinal research that has been interpreted to support the criminalization hy-
pothesis is the product of research designs that are simply incapable of the test. It is
impossible to determine whether there has been a shift of population from the mental
health system to the criminal justice system by examining indicators pertinent only to
one of the two systems. For example, incompetency to stand trial is an indicator perti-
nent only to the criminal justice system. To show that there has been growth in the
number or proportion of defendants examined for or found to be incompetent to stand





The stratified sample I selected, weighted to correctly represent
the misdemeanor defendant population sampled, 42 revealed that
18.38% of the prosecuted population had an admission record 43 at
the county mental health complex. Defendants with a psychiatric
history differed in some important respects from the defendants
without such records. The psychiatric group was comprised of a
greater share of white defendants; 44% of the psychiatric group
were white compared to 36% of the others (X 2 = 15.46; p < 0.01).
The psychiatric group had a larger share (62% compared to 48%;
X 2 = 41.08; p < 0.01) of defendants older than the average
(weighted) age of misdemeanor defendants, 28.5 years of age. The
psychiatric group of misdemeanants also had more extensive crimi-
nal records than the non-psychiatric group. Sixty-six percent of the
psychiatric group, but only 46% of the comparison group, had been
charged with a criminal offense at some earlier point (X 2 = 80.98; p
< 0.01), an association which is not diminished when age is con-
trolled. Furthermore, the criminal records of the psychiatric group
were more serious than the records of their non-psychiatric counter-
parts. Thirty percent of the psychiatric group had at least one prior
felony charge (X 2 = 22.68; p < 0.01) compared to 19% of the non-
& Lister, supra note 5) is to show only that. Given the case law of the 1960s and early
1970s, (see, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402 (1960); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375
(1966)), the increased use of lawyers to represent poor people charged with lesser
crimes, the advances in the understanding and use of psychotropic medicine, and the
renewed faith in psychiatric treatment after it bottomed out in the mid-sixties, one
should expect that the number of evaluations and commitments for incompetency to
stand trial would increase. This signifies little more than an increase in attention. Simi-
lar problems plague the research conducted by Bonovitz & Bonovitz, Diversion of the Men-
tally Ill into the Criminal Justice System: The Police Intervention Perspective, 138 AM. J. or
PSYCHIATRY 973 (1981), and Bonovitz & Guy, supra note 16. Conclusions about the pop-
ulation shift from one system to another would require more complete and thorough
analyses of the two systems and the populations they served over time. The research by
Steadman, Monahan, Duffee, Hartstone, & Robbins, supra note 5, did not suffer from
this particular problem. Interestingly, Steadman and associates concluded that their
findings did not support the criminalization hypothesis.
42 All population estimates are based on weighting the 2184 cases to adjust for the
stratified sampling technique: the 1068 defendants who had a history of mental disorder
account for only 401 weighted cases, which is their correct proportion (18.38%) in the
prosecuted population; the 1116 cases of non-psychiatric defendants have been
weighted to comprise 81.62% of the sample (N = 1783). Note is made in the text when
weighted cases are used.
43 Although called an admission record, it is important to keep in mind that this




psychiatric group. Again, this statistically significant difference per-
sists when age is controlled.
I observed no differences between the psychiatric and non-psy-
chiatric groups with respect to defense representation. Approxi-
mately 80% of each group were represented by public defenders, an
indication that the vast majority of both groups had limited financial
resources.
Differences between the two groups of defendants are notewor-
thy with regard to only two of the charges levied against the two
groups. Retail theft accounted for a larger share of the charges
among the psychiatric group (23% compared to 13%; X 2 = 40.38;
p < 0.01), while issuing worthless checks was much more common
among defendants without psychiatric records (12% compared to
6%; X 2 = 29.51; p < 0.01). Other differences with respect to the
type of charges issued were negligible. For both groups, disorderly
conduct, retail theft, and battery were the three most common
charges. These three offenses accounted for 51% of the psychiatric
group's charges and 43% of the comparison group's charges. The
number of cases in each of three offense categories-disorderly con-
duct, retail theft, and battery-is sufficiently large to allow examina-
tion of various aspects of criminalization while controlling for each
of these three offenses. 44
2. Are Defendants with a Psychiatric History Treated More Severely?
Considered together, the findings portrayed in Table 1 support
the summary conclusion that the sanctions imposed on defendants
with a psychiatric history were more severe, even when controlling
for the seriousness of the offense, with one important exception,
battery. Four of the five criminalization indicators displayed in Ta-
ble 1-custody, cash bail, detention for more than two weeks, and
imprisonment-are related to decisions to maintain physical custody
of the defendant. Judging from these custody indicators, the group
of defendants with a psychiatric history fared worse than their coun-
terparts (compare the two left-most columns in Table 1 with each
other).45 Except for those charged with battery, more of the psychi-
atric group was taken into custody initially, and detained for rela-
tively long periods of time, despite the fact that cash bail was not
44 More than 100 defendants in each group, based on unweighted counts, were
charged with each of these three offenses.
45 Although several of the differences displayed in Table 1 and discussed in this sec-
tion as differences fall short of statistical significance at 957o level of certainty, the fact
that the differences are fairly consistent across categories and appear to establish gen-
eral trends encourages faith in their validity.
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TABLE 1
CRIMINALIZATION OF DEFENDANTS WITH A PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY.
(figures in percents; "*" denotes a difference from the comparison
group that is statistically significant at p < 0.05)
Indicators of mental disordera
Criminalization Indicators None Eval Inpt >2 Inpt >2 Invol
Disorderly conduct (N=398)b (209) (189) (140) (65) (46)
taken into custody 53 80* 88* 88* 85
cash bail required" 42 23* 21* 19* 26
detained >2 weeksd 11 22* 25* 32* 39
convicted 71 60 53* 42* 43
imprisonede 9 25* 28* 44* 45*
Retail theft (N=388) (139) (249) (174) (80) (46)
taken into custody 79 86 88* 90* 87
cash bail required' 33 27 25 29 28
detained >2 weeksd 25 27 32 36* 37
convicted 56 59 61 63 61
imprisonede 49 54 57 64 61
Battery (N=262) (143) (119) (81) (27) (16)
taken into custody 93 90 94 88 87
cash bail required 26 29 26 31 33
detained >2 weeksd 34 50* 54* 59* 75
convicted 35 38 36 30 19
imprisonede 32 44 38 50 67
Other misdemeanors (N=1138) (627) (511) (337) (111) (49)
taken into custody 69 78* 83* 86* 92*
cash bail required' 31 26 24 21* 23
detained >2 weeksd 24 28 31* 37* 45*
convicted 42 47 45 39 31
imprisonede 35 39 44 56* 53
aEach of the categories included under "indicators of mental disorder" is a subset of
the category to its left. The categories "None" and "Eval" sum to the total N of
cases for that category (row). "None" = no record at county mental health complex
(CMHC). "Eval" = evaluated for treatment at CMHC. "Inpt" = admitted at least
once as an inpatient at CMHC. ">2 Inpt" = more than two inpatient admissions at
CMHC. ">2 Invol" = more than two involuntary inpatient admissions at CMHC.
bFigures in parentheses are unweighted case Ns pertinent to that category.
9Based only on those for whom release terms were stated.
dPertains only to pretrial jail detention; does not include time spent in custody at a
psychiatric facility pursuant to an Incompetency to Stand Trial (IST) or Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity (NGRI) evaluation or commitment.
'Based only on those convicted.
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required of them more often. In addition, if convicted, more of the
psychiatric group was imprisoned than the non-psychiatric group.
Furthermore, the differences were ever greater for each more nar-
rowly defined psychiatric group. In other words, if convicted, more
of the defendants who had been hospitalized were imprisoned than
their non-psychiatric counterparts, and an even greater percentage
of defendants who had been hospitalized more than twice were im-
prisoned (compare figures from left to right across rows labelled
"custody," "detained > 2 weeks," and "imprisoned"). These gen-
eral trends are evident for each of the three offenses considered in-
dividually (except for the deviation noted above in the case of
battery), as well as for misdemeanants charged with all other of-
fenses considered together.
Conviction rates are one important exception to this general
trend of punitiveness. Of those charged with disorderly conduct,
the psychiatric group was convicted less often than the comparison
group. Of those charged with battery or "other misdemeanors,"
only the defendants with a history of repeated psychiatric hospital-
izations were convicted less often than the defendants in the com-
parison group. For the most part, the data indicate that for
defendants with repeated psychiatric hospitalizations, conviction is
less frequent. Furthermore, among those charged with disorderly
conduct, this leniency is extended to those with less evidence of a
chronic problem.
Retail theft convictions pose a contrast to the general trend in
convictions. Of those charged with retail theft, the psychiatric
group was convicted just about as often as the comparison group.
However, this offense-specific deviation from the generally lenient
conviction trend can be explained. Misdemeanor retail theft is fre-
quently settled with a restitution agreement and the case subse-
quently dismissed short of judgment. Often the mentally
disordered either do not have the financial means to enter into such
an agreement, or do not give the impression that they will follow
through on such an agreement, and are therefore less likely to settle
the case short of judgment.
3. Are Defendants with a Psychiatric History Treated as Patients?
This data set includes measures that indicate which defendants
were officially recognized by the criminal justice system as having
some mental health problem (i.e., as "patients"). These indicators
identify defendants who at some point invoked the insanity defense,
those for whom an evaluation and/or treatment for incompetency to
[Vol. 82
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TABLE 2
COINCIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS' PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY AND
EVALUATION/TREATMENT ORDERED BY THE CRIMINAL COURT.
(figures in percents; "*" denotes a difference from the comparison
group that is statistically significant at p < 0.05)
Indicators of mental disorder'
Court-ordered eval./treatmentb None Eval Inpt >2 Inpt >2 Invol
Disorderly conduct (N=398)c (20) (T99) (140) (65) -- W
None 96 67* 59* 48* 44*
CJSMHT 4 33* 41* 52* 56*
OCJMHT 3 26* 32* 37* 37*
ISTEVAL 2 16* 21* 32* 35*
ISTCOMM 1 9* 1l* 19* 22*
Retail Theft (N=388) (139) (249) (174) (80) (46)
None 96 80* 76* 64* 50*
CJSMHT 4 20* 24* 36* 50*
OCJMHT 3 15* 18* 25* 30*
ISTEVAL 2 7 9* 16* 28*
ISTCOMM 1 4 5 11* 20*
Battery (N=262) (143) (119) (81) (27) (16)
None 94 71* 70* 52* 38*
CJSMHT 6 29* 30* 48* 62*
OCJMHT 6 26* 25* 33* 44*
ISTEVAL 0 8* 11* 30* 38*
ISTCOMM - 4* 6* 19* 31*
Other misdemeanors (N= 1138) (627) (511) (337) (111) (49)
None 95 78* 73* 60* 57*
CJSMHT 5 22* 27* 40* 43*
OCJMHT 5 16* 18* 23* 25*
ISTEVAL 1 9* 13* 26* 30*
ISTCOMM 0 6* 9* 21* 26*
'Each of the categories included under "indicators of mental disorder" is a
subset of the category to its left. The categories "None" and "Eval" sum to
the total N of cases for that offense category; they are mutually exclusive
and exhaustive of the cases in that category (row). "None" = no record at
county mental health complex (CMHC). "Eval" = evaluated for treatment
at CMHC. "Inpt" = admitted at least once as an inpatient at CMHC. ">2
Inpt" = more than two inpatient admissions at CMHC. ">2 Invol" -
more than two involuntary inpatient admissions at CMHC.
bDefinitions of categories:
CJSMHT = "criminal justice system mental health treatment." This
category includes defendants whose cases involve the insanity defense, an
IST evaluation or commitment, or any treatment condition of pretrial
release or probation. This category is mutually exclusive of the category
"None," and the two are exhaustive of the cases in that category (column).
OCJMHT = "other criminal mental health treatment." This is a subset of
CJSMHT and includes only those who had treatment imposed as a condition
of pretrail release or probation.
ISTEVAL = "IST evaluation." This is a subset of CJSMHT and includes
all those who were evaluated for IST (Incompetency to Stand Trial).
ISTCOMM = "IST commitment." This category includes only those
commited after being found IST. The three subsets of CJSMHT-
OCJMHT, ISTEVAL, and ISTCOMM-are neither mutually exclusive nor
exhaustive of CJSMHT.
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stand trial was ordered, and those for whom mental health treat-
ment was a condition of either pretrial freedom or probation.
Only a minority of defendants with psychiatric records were
recognized and treated as patients.46 Twenty-four percent (N =
259) of the psychiatric group was required to undergo evaluation or
treatment by order of the criminal court. Nonetheless, defendants
with a psychiatric history were far more often recognized as patients
in the criminal justice system than were their counterparts without
psychiatric records (compare the two left-most columns in Table 2
with each other). Furthermore, the defendant group with more than
two inpatient hospitalizations and the group with more than two in-
voluntary inpatient hospitalizations were even more likely to be
evaluated or treated than defendants with less extensive psychiatric
records (compare the two right-most columns in Table 2 with the
ones further to the left). Thus, the degree of involvement with the
mental health system is clearly and positively associated with the im-
position of mental health treatment or evaluations in the criminal
justice system.
The criminal justice system rarely imposed mental health evalu-
ation or treatment on defendants who did not have a record of ad-
mission at the county mental health complex. Only 5% of the non-
psychiatric defendants were evaluated or treated by order of the
court. In sum, the data suggest that when mental health evaluation
or treatment is imposed by the criminal court, there is often some
history of psychiatric problem to justify the order.
4. If Recognized as Patients, Are Defendants Treated More Punitively?
Judging from the findings displayed in Table 3, the criminal jus-
tice system imposed more severe sanctions on those defendants who
had been treated as patients in the criminal justice system and who
had a verifiable psychiatric history ("twice-recognized defendants").
Reference to Table 3 establishes that most of the statistically signifi-
cant differences between the comparison group (the leftmost col-
umn) and any other group in the sample are concentrated in the
group of defendants who had both a psychiatric history and were
evaluated or treated by order of the criminal court. With isolated
exceptions, the findings suggest that the twice-recognized defend-
ants were treated more punitively; more of them were taken into
custody, held in custody, and convicted (see the three right-most
columns in Table 3).
For the most part, twice-recognized defendants were detained
46 See notes 33 and 34, supra.
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before trial for longer periods than their counterparts, a finding not
easily explained with these data. The twice-recognized defendants
were not required to post cash bail any more frequently than were
the comparison defendants (see Table 3), and were less likely than
the comparison group to be denied release due to holds relating to
other pending charges, probation or parole (X2 = 35.11; p < 0.01).
Furthermore, the twice-recognized defendants were not required to
post greater amounts of cash bail. Where there were differences in
the amount of cash bail, the twice-recognized defendants were
granted more lenient terms, although the differences are not statisti-
cally significant. The longer pretrial detention cannot be attributed
to time spent in custody for psychiatric evaluation. Most of the eval-
uations took only a few hours and were conducted in the jail itself
without interrupting the detention. If the detention was interrupted
by hospitalization for evaluation, days in the hospital were not in-
cluded in the tally of days spent in jail. Ruling out the above expla-
nations, I conjectured that the longer pretrial detention of the twice-
recognized defendants may be related to their relative social and
economic marginality, factors which would negatively affect their
ability to make cash bail.
In general, conviction rates were higher for the twice-
recognized defendants. Retail theft conviction rates for twice-
recognized defendants were not significantly different from those of
the comparison group. There are two important exceptions to the
general trend of more severe sanctions against the twice-recognized
group: (1) the lower conviction rate for defendants found incompe-
tent to stand trial and committed for treatment, and (2) the lower
conviction rates for all disorderly conduct defendants who had any
treatment or evaluation imposed on them by the court. Across all
offense categories, the defendants who had been committed for
treatment due to incompetency to stand trial had low conviction
rates, a noticeable contrast to other twice-recognized defendants
who, for the most part, had higher conviction rates than their com-
parison group counterparts. This apparent leniency toward com-
mitted defendants seems to extend to other treated or evaluated
defendants charged with disorderly conduct. Nearly three-quarters
of the comparison group of defendants, but only one-third of the
twice-recognized defendants, were convicted of disorderly conduct.
Of those convicted, the twice-recognized defendants were
treated more harshly with respect to sentence as well. Twice-
recognized disorderly conduct and battery defendants were impris-
oned more often than the comparison defendants. While imprison-
ment rates for retail theft and other misdemeanor defendants were
1991] 353
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not higher among the twice-recognized, those defendants were
nonetheless more severely sanctioned. More of them were placed
under supervision on probation, and very few were punished with
only a fine.
A fine as the only sanction was a common punishment for the
comparison group, but not for twice-recognized defendants. Con-
sidering only the comparison group, 11% of the battery defendants,
18% of the retail theft defendants, and 19% of the other misde-
meanor defendants were punished by a fine only; a large majority
(74%) of the disorderly conduct defendants were fined. In stark
contrast, none of the twice-recognized defendants escaped with
merely a fine for their offense (differences between the comparison
and the twice-recognized groups are statistically significant at p <
.05 for all four offense categories). In short, the twice-recognized
defendants were not freed after conviction at the same rate as were
the comparison defendants.
5. Are the Cases Involving Mentally Disordered Defendants
Indistinguishable From Other Cases with Respect to
Processing and Disposition?
This third possible specification of the term criminalization can
be ruled out as a result of the findings presented above. There are
obvious and even pronounced differences between the twice-
recognized defendants and the comparison group. There are lesser,
but discernible, differences in the case processing and disposition of
defendants who either (a) had a psychiatric history, or (b) were or-
dered by the court to undergo psychiatric evaluation or treatment.
III. DISCUSSION
The most pronounced leniency with respect to conviction is
concentrated among those who were found incompetent to stand
trial and were committed for treatment. There is no doubt that part
of this leniency is a direct result of state law governing incompe-
tency commitment procedures. The critical task here is to deter-
mine how much apparent leniency is due to other factors. More
specifically, it is important to determine whether the apparent leni-
ency in sanctions is an integral part of a pattern of subversion of the
criminal justice process to respond to perceived mental health treat-
ment needs of persons who may also be cast as criminal defendants.
This issue is a logical, and sinister, extension of the second specifi-
cation of the term criminalization, namely that the mentally disor-
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dered are treated as patients in the criminal justice system and, as
such, are forced to undergo psychiatric treatment.
The criminal procedures that authorize commitment and treat-
ment of the incompetent defendant provide an opportunity to sub-
vert the criminal justice system and use it instead as a means of
imposing treatment on the resistant patient. For example, a men-
tally disordered person could be arrested, charged with an offense
such as disorderly conduct, and then evaluated and committed for
incompetency to stand trial. State law in this jurisdiction restricts
the duration of an incompetency commitment to either (a) eighteen
months, with an additional six months under certain circumstances,
or (b) the maximum potential term of imprisonment authorized for
the offense charged.47 Thus, for misdemeanor offenses, all commit-
ments for incompetency are limited to twelve months (the absolute
maximum term authorized for any misdemeanor offense) or less. In
most misdemeanor cases, the maximum authorized 'penalty is nine
months, 48 and in the case of disorderly conduct, the maximum penal
incarceration is ninety days. 49 If the defendant is not restored to
competency within the allotted time, or if it becomes apparent that
the defendant is not likely to regain competency, the defendant
must be discharged from the criminal commitment,50 and as a mat-
ter of practice, the court grants a motion to dismiss. Alternatively, if
the incompetent is restored to competency, any time spent in con-
finement for evaluation or treatment must be credited to the sen-
tence if the defendant is subsequently convicted and incarcerated. 51
The court, of course, may decide to dismiss the case and impose no
criminal punishment. If the criminal justice system were being used,
at least in a discernible number of cases, as an alternative to invol-
untary civil commitment, then one would expect evidence of expan-
sive use of the treatment options under state law, and a
corresponding conservative use of criminal sanctions in those cases.
The findings from these data, however, simply do not provide
any evidence of wholesale subversion of the criminal process to ac-
complish psychiatric treatment goals, even in the case of defendants
evaluated and/or committed for incompetency. First of all, only a
47 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.14(5)(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990). The law governing
duration of commitment for incompetency in Wisconsin is one of the more restrictive in
the country. See Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Developnents in the Law, in MENTALLY
DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 3, 21-2 (J. Monahan
& H. Steadman eds. 1983).
48 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
49 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.01 & 939.51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
50 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.14(6) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
51 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.14(5)(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
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very small fraction of defendants (2.6%, based on weighted N) were
evaluated for incompetency. State law restricts hospitalization for
evaluations for incompetency to fifteen days under normal circum-
stances; when good cause is shown, the fifteen days may be ex-
tended to thirty days. 52 For the defendants in this study, evaluations
for incompetency were usually completed in a very short time. Sev-
enty-two percent of the incompetency evaluations took less than one
day. Only nine (20%) of the forty-six defendants who were evalu-
ated, but not committed, were hospitalized for longer than fifteen
days.
Of the defendants examined for incompetency, only slightly
more than one-half (54%; N = 55) were judged to be incompetent.
Defendants found incompetent to stand trial and committed for
treatment were generally not hospitalized for the maximum amount
of time allowable by law. Counting both time spent in evaluation
and treatment to restore competency, more than half of the commit-
ted defendants were hospitalized less than forty percent of the
amount of time they could have been, given the potential punish-
ment for their charges. 53 In all, only seven (13%) of the committed
defendants did not become competent to stand trial; of these seven,
two were discharged after being hospitalized for only part (25% and
76%) of their potential criminal incarceration. The remaining five
defendants were hospitalized long enough to "max out," i.e., to be
discharged because their hospital confinement had reached its maxi-
mum duration under law. These findings do not suggest a norm of
expansive use of the psychiatric treatment options available under
the criminal procedure statutes. Rather, these findings suggest a
prudent use of criminal treatment options in a state that has rela-
tively restrictive incompetency commitment laws.
Even though there is no evidence that treatment options were
expansively utilized, it is clear that the court was reluctant to convict
defendants who had been committed. Except in the case of disor-
derly conduct defendants, this leniency was not extended to those
evaluated but not committed, or to those required to cooperate with
some treatment plan as a condition of pretrial release or probation.
Except for the disorderly conduct defendants, the leniency shown to
twice-recognized defendants was restricted to those committed for
incompetency. The majority (80%; N = 44) of cases against the
52 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.14(2)(c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
53 Of course, the law requires periodic reports of progress and examinations for fit-
ness to stand trial, and it is clear that the legally allowable period of time should be only
that which is necessary to accomplish the goal. The point here is that the spirit of the
mandate to confine only for the amount of time necessary appears to be observed.
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fifty-five committed defendants were terminated by dismissal. Seven
(13%o) of the fifty-five committed defendants were not restored to
competency, leaving the court with no alternative but to dismiss the
charges. In addition, however, dismissal was the result in 77%o (N
37) of the cases in which the defendant had been committed and
later found competent to stand trial (N = 48). Furthermore, dismis-
sal was a common disposition in cases where the defendant had
been evaluated but not committed. Nearly half (46%; N = 21) of
the cases against defendants who were evaluated, but not found in-
competent, were dismissed.
The exceptional leniency shown twice-recognized defendants
charged with disorderly conduct with respect to conviction is in-
triguing and defies ready explanation. Several plausible explana-
tions suggest themselves, all of which are highly speculative and
none of which can be addressed by these data. This deviation from
the norm is consistent with two theses presented in previous
criminalization literature, which are noted below.
Teplin54 showed that the police differentially selected the men-
tally disordered for arrest. If the same phenomenon were operating
in this study jurisdiction, then the markedly lower conviction rates
of the twice-recognized defendants charged with disorderly conduct
is perhaps a sign of judicial correction for the over-selection of the
mentally disordered by law-enforcement agents. 55 If that is an accu-
rate explanation, however, it should be stressed that the differential
selection in enforcement was corrected rather than ratified at the
point of judgment.
Not inconsistent with Teplin's thesis of differential over-selec-
tion, is a thesis proposed by Hochstedler, 56 which relates to the
court's selective use of leniency. Hochstedler's findings suggested
that unless some minimum threshold of seriousness was crossed,
the mentally disordered were treated with leniency by the criminal
court. Disorderly conduct is among the least serious offenses
processed by the criminal court, and as such, may be below that un-
spoken threshold of seriousness. Congruent with this explanation is
the nature of sentences imposed on those convicted of disorderly
conduct. Most disorderly conduct cases incur a fine only, although
none of the twice-recognized defendants incurred such a sanction.
If the court determines its judgment in part on the feasibility and
effectiveness of sanctions available, then perhaps the court sees no
54 Teplin, supra note 5.
55 See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 20.
56 See Hochstedler, supra note 15.
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point in judging many of the twice-recognized disorderly conduct
defendants guilty. If the individual and offense do not warrant in-
carceration or probation, and if a fine is practically futile, then per-
haps the court declines to find guilt.
The inability to explain with certainty the leniency accorded
twice-recognized disorderly conduct defendants leaves open the
possibility that, with respect to this single vague offense category,
the criminal justice system is being subverted to control mentally
disordered persons who would otherwise escape criminal prosecu-
tion. The totality of the findings presented here make that possibil-
ity seem remote. Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled out as a possible
explanation of the unusual conviction trends for disorderly conduct
defendants.
IV. CONCLUSION
The findings from this large, stratified random sample of mis-
demeanor defendants provide the basis for some firm conclusions.
As a group, defendants with psychiatric records were criminally
sanctioned more severely than defendants without psychiatric
records, and defendants with relatively extensive psychiatric records
were even more severely sanctioned. Defendants with psychiatric
records were more often ordered by the criminal court to undergo
psychiatric evaluation and treatment. As a group, defendants with
psychiatric records are distinguishable from other defendants with
respect to case processing and disposition.
These data provide little support for the notion that the crimi-
nal justice system has been subverted to operate as a substitute for
civil commitment. Only a minority (24%) of defendants with psy-
chiatric records had any kind of psychiatric evaluation or treatment
imposed on them. Of those evaluated for incompetency, only about
half were found incompetent; and the vast majority of those initially
evaluated as incompetent were later determined to have regained
competency. The maximum period of time allowed for either the
evaluation or treatment for incompetency was only rarely used.
These findings indicate conservative rather than expansive use of
treatment options available under the incompetency commitment
laws. Only with respect to the exceptionally low conviction rates of
disorderly conduct defendants who had a psychiatric record and had
been subjected to some form of psychiatric evaluation or treatment
by the criminal court is there even the slightest possibility that in the
name of the criminal process, treatment options were used expan-
sively while criminal sanctions were used conservatively.
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On balance, these findings lead to the conclusion that the men-
tally disordered, especially if recognized as such in the criminal pro-
cess, are sanctioned more severely than other defendants, both in
process and punishment. The empirically grounded specification of
"criminalization," then, is relatively greater punitiveness. The conclu-
sions drawn from this study surely will reinforce the valid concerns
about the humane treatment of mentally disordered persons en-
snarled in the criminal justice system. On the other hand, concerns
about the integrity of the criminal justice system and the possible
subversion of its processes should be allayed by these findings.
